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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
JOHN R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge. 
 
Louise Robichaud appeals the district court's1 entry of 
summary judgment against her on AT&T Management 
Pension Plan's complaint for declaratory relief. The Plan 
sought a declaration that Robichaud was not entitled to 
pre-retirement survivor's annuity benefits of her former 
husband, Winston Samaroo, who died while still actively 
employed by AT&T Technologies. Although the Samaroo- 
Robichaud divorce decree did not state that Robichaud 
should receive benefits under Samaroo's pre-retirement 
survivor's annuity, after Samaroo's death Robichaud 
obtained a nunc pro tunc amendment to the divorce decree 
purportedly creating such an entitlement. The district court 
held that the amended order was not a qualified domestic 
relations order capable of conferring on Robichaud the 
benefits she seeks. We affirm. 
 
Robichaud and Samaroo were divorced on October 25, 
1984, by the New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery 
Division. The divorce decree incorporated a property 
settlement reached by the parties which had the following 
language concerning Robichaud's rights in Samaroo's 
pension benefits: 
 
       (d) Pensions, Profit Sharing and Bell System Savings 
       Plan 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr., United States District Judge for 
the District of New Jersey. 
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       Savings Plan-- (1) Husband has a vested pension 
       having a present value, if husband were to retire at 
       this time, of $1,358.59 per month. At the time of 
       husband's retirement and receipt of his pension he 
       agrees to pay to wife one half of said monthly amount. 
 
Neither the decree nor the property settlement mentions 
any rights to Samaroo's survivor's annuity. 
 
Samaroo died at the age of 53 on September 20, 1987, 
about three years after the divorce, while still actively 
employed by AT&T. He was covered under the AT&T 
Management Pension Plan, a defined benefit plan which 
provided pensions and survivors' annuities in amounts 
based on a percentage of the employee's average salary 
times years of service. Based on Samaroo's age and years of 
service, he had a vested right to a deferred vested pension, 
which would have begun, at the earliest, at age 55. Because 
Samaroo did not live to the age to qualify to receive pension 
payments, there were, strictly speaking, no pension benefits 
that ever became payable in respect of Samaroo. Therefore, 
the benefit expressly mentioned in the divorce settlement 
agreement never came to fruition. 
 
However, the Plan provides a pre-retirement survivor 
annuity available to the surviving spouse of any Plan 
participant who died after vesting but before retiring. If 
there is no surviving spouse, there is no annuity. 
 
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 as it existed at the time of the Samaroo-Robichaud 
divorce, it was unclear whether state divorce decrees could 
effectively convey a share in one spouse's pension benefits 
to the other spouse. See generally Dial v. NFL Player 
Supplemental Disability Plan, 174 F.3d 606, 610 (5th Cir. 
1999); ABA Section of Labor and Employment Law, 
Employee Benefits Law 171-72 (1991). The Retirement 
Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, enacted in August 
1984 and effective January 1, 1985, amended ERISA to 
provide that pension benefits may be alienated by means of 
a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (known as a QDRO), 
29 U.S.C. S 1056(d)(3)(A) (1994). Although the Retirement 
Equity Act was not in effect on October 25, 1984, the date 
of the Samaroo-Robichaud divorce, plan administrators 
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may, in their discretion, treat orders entered before the date 
of the Act as QDROs. S. Rep. No. 98-575, at 23 (1984), 
reprinted in 1984 U.S.S.C.A.N. 2547, 2569. 
 
The Plan denied Robichaud's claim for a pre-retirement 
survivor's annuity because the divorce decree did not 
mention any entitlement to such rights, and in the absence 
of a surviving spouse or a QDRO designating a former 
spouse as such, there was simply no pre-retirement 
survivor's annuity payable in respect of Samaroo.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Robichaud has chosen to amend the original divorce decree rather 
than relying on that decree to entitle her to the pre-retirement 
survivor's 
annuity; however, she suggests in her reply brief that the original decree 
could have been read to give her that right. Robichaud tells us the only 
issue in this case is the validity of the amended order, and therefore we 
conclude that the adequacy of the original decree is not before us. 
However, we briefly observe that there are several problems with reading 
the original decree to convey a survivor's annuity to Robichaud. First, 
the property settlement apparently only gives Robichaud the right to 
receive one half of Samaroo's pension payments of $1,358.89 per month, 
the value of Samaroo's pension rights at the time of the divorce. This 
shows an intent to divide property rights existing at the time of the 
divorce, not to give Robichaud an interest in post-divorce earnings. 
Robichaud now claims half of all benefits payable with respect to 
Samaroo, including benefits earned after the divorce. 
 
Second, the original decree entitles Robichaud to receive the benefit 
payments at the time they were paid out to Samaroo, rather than 
conveying to her a portion of Samaroo's interest in the Plan. Since no 
benefits became payable to Samaroo himself, the original decree 
evidently did not convey anything. See Dugan v. Clinton, No. 86 C 8492, 
1987 WL 11640, at *3-*4 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 1987) (unpublished) (divorce 
order entitling wife to portion of husband's "monthly pension plan 
benefit payment" when received did not convey interest in pre-retirement 
survivor annuity); see generally Pamela D. Perdue, "Pension and Welfare 
Benefit Administration QDRO Guidelines, 62 ALI-ABA Course of Study 
Materials 743, 756-57 (1998) (distinguishing between "separate interest" 
QDROs that divide the actual pension, and "shared payment" QDRO's 
which merely split the stream of payments and in which "the alternate 
payee will not receive any payments unless the participant receives 
payments or is already in pay status"). 
 
Third, the original decree was silent on the issue of survivor's rights. 
Congress has required QDROs to be quite specific in order to convey 
ERISA benefits. The statute requires a QDRO to state specifically the 
 
                                4 
  
Robichaud filed a motion in the New Jersey Superior Court, 
Chancery Division, to amend the Final Judgment of Divorce 
nunc pro tunc to convey to her a right tofifty percent of the 
preretirement survivor's annuity payable in respect of 
Samaroo. Samaroo v. Samaroo, 743 F. Supp. 309, 311 
(D.N.J. 1990). Robichaud joined the Plan as a defendant in 
the divorce case. Id. The Plan removed the action to federal 
court and also filed a complaint for declaratory relief in the 
same court. Id. The two cases were consolidated. The 
district court remanded that portion of the removed case 
that involved the terms of the divorce, but retained 
jurisdiction of Robichaud's claim against the Plan for the 
retirement benefits. Id. at 317. 
 
After a hearing, the New Jersey state court held that the 
Plan did not have standing to object to alteration of the 
divorce decree. Winston Samaroo's estate did not oppose 
Robichaud's request to amend the decree nunc pro tunc, 
since conveying the survivorship rights once Samaroo was 
dead did not cost the estate anything, but undid the effect 
of Samaroo dying without a survivor. The attorney who 
drafted the agreement testified that the issue of survivor's 
benefits never came up at the time of the agreement: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
extent of the alternate payee's interest in the plan, 29 U.S.C. 
S 1056(d)(3)(C)(ii) and (iii), and states that for purposes of survivor 
annuities, a former spouse can be treated as a surviving spouse "to the 
extent provided in any qualified domestic relations order." 29 U.S.C. 
S 1056(d)(3)(F). In Roth v. Roth, 506 N.W.2d 900 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993), 
the divorce order conveyed an interest in pension rights, but said 
nothing about survivorship rights. After the husband's death, the former 
wife sought to amend the decree retroactively to give herself the 
survivorship rights that otherwise would lapse. The Michigan courts, 
applying federal law, held that the decree did not entitle the former wife 
to a pre-retirement survivor's annuity. Id. at 903. Compare Indiana State 
Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. Veclotch, 785 F. Supp. 106,108- 
110 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (genuine issue of fact as to parties' intent 
regarding 
survivor annuity precluded summary judgment where divorce agreement 
referred only to pension, but there was extraneous evidence that parties 
negotiated survivorship issue and intended former wife to receive 
survivorship rights). 
 
Fourth, the original decree was entered before the effective date of the 
Retirement Equity Act. See page 3, supra. 
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       Q: That section [of the agreement] is silent on the 
       issue of survivor benefits? 
 
       A: That's correct. 
 
       Q: Okay. Was the survivor benefit addressed at that 
       time? 
 
       A: No, it never came to mind at that time, it wasn't 
       brought up at all by you [Robichaud], or by 
       Winston, or by me. 
 
Robichaud herself testified that "neither Winston [nor his 
attorney] or I thought about the survivor rights to this 
pension." Based on the evidence that the divorce was 
amicable, the state court amended the divorce decree 
retroactively to give Robichaud "rights of survivorship to 
50% of [Samaroo's] vested pension benefits." The court 
stated, however, that whether or not the state court order 
resulted in any benefits becoming payable to Robichaud 
under the Plan was a question of federal law over which the 
federal court had retained jurisdiction and which would 
have to be resolved by the federal court. 
 
After the state court's ruling, Robichaud and the Plan 
filed cross motions for summary judgment in the pending 
federal district court action. The district court examined the 
statutory requirements for a QDRO under 29 U.S.C. 
S 1056(d)(3)(C) and(D). The court held that the amended 
divorce order satisfied the specificity requirements of 
section 1056(d)(3)(C), but not the substantive requirements 
of section 1056(d)(3)(D). Under that section a domestic 
relations order is not a QDRO if it requires the plan to 
provide any type of benefits not otherwise provided by the 
plan or to provide increased benefits. 29 U.S.C. 
S 1056(d)(3)(D)(i) and (ii). The court relied on the reasoning 
of Hopkins v. AT&T Global Information Solutions Co., 105 
F.3d 153, 156 (4th Cir. 1997), to conclude that entitlement 
to a survivor's annuity in respect of Samaroo had to be 
determined as of the day Samaroo died, and that the 
amended divorce decree represented an attempt to obtain 
increased benefits from the Plan. The court therefore 
entered summary judgment for the Plan and against 
Robichaud. Robichaud appeals. 
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We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, using 
the same standard the district court must use: summary 
judgment is proper only if there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Hullett v. Towers, 
Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc., 38 F.3d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
 
The district court stated that it would review the Plan's 
denial of Robichaud's claim under the arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review appropriate when, as here, a 
benefit plan gives the plan administrator discretionary 
authority to construe the terms of the plan. See Firestone 
Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). 29 
U.S.C. S 1056(d)(3)(G)(i)(II) requires the plan administrator 
to make the initial determination of whether an order is a 
QDRO. However, we conclude that the issue in this case is 
a question of statutory construction regarding the 
requisites of a QDRO, rather than a question of 
interpretation of the Plan. Cf. Hullett, 38 F.3d at 114 
(reserving question of whether administrator's finding of 
QDRO is reviewed de novo). The deferential standard of 
review of a plan interpretation "is appropriate only when 
the trust instrument allows the trustee to interpret the 
instrument and when the trustee has in fact interpreted the 
instrument." Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 567 (3d Cir. 
1995) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation omitted), 
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1115 (1996). In this case, there is no 
dispute about the interpretation of the Plan, but only about 
whether the nunc pro tunc order qualifies as a QDRO under 
federal law. We must review legal conclusions and 
questions of statutory construction de novo. See Dial v. NFL 
Player Supplemental Disability Plan, 174 F.3d 606, 611 (5th 
Cir. 1999) (court should review de novo administrator's 
decision that a property settlement agreement constituted a 
QDRO, since that involves interpretation of settlement 
agreement and statutory construction, not interpretation of 
the plan). 
 
We turn first to the statutory language defining QDROs. 
Under section 1056(d)(3)(D) 
 
       A domestic relations order meets the requirements of 
       this subparagraph only if such order-- 
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       (i) does not require a plan to provide any type or 
       form of benefit, or any option, not otherwise provided 
       under the plan, [and] 
 
       (ii) does not require the plan to provide increased 
       benefits (determined on the basis of actuarial value) 
       . . . . 
 
A domestic decree that would have the effect of increasing 
the liability of the Plan over what has been provided in the 
Plan (read in light of federal law) is not a QDRO, no matter 
what the decree's status under state law. The district court 
held that a decree conferring survivor's benefits on 
Robichaud after those benefits have lapsed would provide 
increased benefits and therefore cannot be a QDRO. 
 
The district court relied on the Fourth Circuit's decision 
in Hopkins, which recognized that defined benefit plans are 
based on actuarial calculations that would be rendered 
invalid if participants were allowed to change the operative 
facts retroactively. In Hopkins a pension plan participant 
retired and began to draw his pension in the form of a joint 
and survivor annuity based on the lives of himself and his 
current wife. Sometime later, his former wife obtained a 
state court order that she should be treated as the 
participant's surviving spouse for purposes of the annuity. 
105 F.3d at 155. The Fourth Circuit held that this domestic 
relations order was not a QDRO because the current wife's 
right to the survivor's benefits vested upon the participant's 
retirement and could no longer be alienated. Id. at 156-57. 
The court observed in a footnote that its holding was 
consistent with actuarial necessity: 
 
       Because the disbursement of plan benefits is based on 
       actuarial computations, the plan administrator must 
       know the life expectancy of the person receiving the 
       Surviving Spouse Benefits to determine the 
       participant's monthly Pension Benefits. As a result, the 
       plan administrator needs to know, on the day the 
       participant retires, to whom the Surviving Spouse 
       Benefit is payable. 
 
105 F.3d at 157 n.7. 
 
Reasoning similar to that in Hopkins was employed in a 
New Jersey survivor benefits case, Ross v. Ross, 705 A.2d 
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784 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998). There, a couple's 
divorce decree purported to convey the survivorship rights 
in the husband's several pension plans to the wife, but as 
to one plan the decree was not specific enough to be 
considered a QDRO. Id. at 795. After the divorce, the 
husband remarried and then died. The first wife attempted 
to have a QDRO entered after the husband's death to 
convey the survivorship rights to her. The New Jersey 
Superior Court, Appellate Division, held that entitlement to 
survivor's rights was determined as of the day of the 
participant's death. Id. at 796-97. Under ERISA, the rights 
could only be conveyed by a QDRO. Because there was no 
QDRO in place at the time of the participant's death, the 
first wife could not change the result by obtaining a more 
specific state court order after the rights had vested in the 
second wife. 
 
Robichaud argues that by determining the right to 
benefits as of the day of Samaroo's death, the Plan has 
cheated Samaroo out of receiving any benefit from 
participating in the Plan. But actually, successful operation 
of a defined benefit plan requires that the plan's liabilities 
be ascertainable as of particular dates. The annuity 
provisions of a defined benefit plan are a sort of insurance, 
based on actuarial calculations predicting the future 
demands on the plan. Some annuity participants will die 
without ever receiving a payment and some participants 
will receive payments far in excess of the value of their 
contributions. The fact that some participants die without 
a surviving spouse to qualify for benefits is not an unfair 
forfeiture, as Robichaud contends, but rather part of the 
ordinary workings of an insurance plan. Allowing the 
insured to change the operative facts after he has lost the 
gamble would wreak actuarial havoc on administration of 
the Plan.3 
 
Besides, it is inaccurate to say that Samaroo was 
deprived of any benefit from the Plan. Until he died, 
Samaroo enjoyed the right to remarry and thereby bestow 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Our holding and opinion are limited to the particular facts before us, 
and it is not necessary that we reach the broader issue expressed in the 
dissent's characterization of our holding, infra at 12. 
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on a new wife the survivorship rights under his 
preretirement annuity. Alternatively, after the enactment of 
the Retirement Equity Act, he could have entered a QDRO 
conveying the rights to Robichaud. (But if Samaroo had 
entered a QDRO making Robichaud his "surviving spouse" 
under the Plan, he would have lost the right to confer the 
same survivorship benefits on a new wife. See 29 U.S.C. 
S 1056 (d)(3)(F) (to the extent QDRO designates former 
spouse as participant's surviving spouse, current spouse 
shall not be treated as spouse for purposes of plan)). When 
Samaroo died without remarrying or naming Robichaud as 
alternate payee of the survivor's rights, the right to dispose 
of the benefits lapsed. Allowing Samaroo (or his estate) to 
preserve the right to confer the benefits on a new wife as 
long as he was alive and had the possibility of remarrying, 
and then to designate Robichaud as the surviving spouse 
after his death, is allowing him to have his cake and eat it, 
too. 
 
Robichaud urges us to follow an unpublished district 
court decision, Payne v. GM/UAW Pension Plan, No. 95-CV- 
73554DT, 1996 WL 943424 (E.D. Mich. May 7, 1996), 
which is of course not binding on us, both because it is a 
district court case and because it is unpublished. There, a 
divorcing couple entered a QDRO specifically denying the 
wife the right to survivor benefits. After the husband's 
remarriage and death, the first wife obtained a nunc pro 
tunc order in the state court giving her the survivorship 
benefits the husband had withheld when he was alive. The 
Eastern District of Michigan held that the nunc pro tunc 
order was effective as a QDRO and that the first wife was 
entitled to survivor's benefits in accord with that order. Id. 
at *8. 
 
Far from being persuaded by the reasoning in Payne, we 
think it provides a telling demonstration of why the order in 
this case cannot be regarded as a QDRO. In Payne, the 
husband expressly refused to designate the first wife as his 
surviving spouse, apparently in view of the fact that he was 
planning to remarry. After his death (which, incidentally, 
occurred before he and his new wife had been married long 
enough for her to qualify for survivor's benefits), the first 
wife took advantage of his absence to obtain an amended 
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decree giving her the benefits she had not been able to 
obtain through the divorce negotiations. This is clearly an 
attempt to expand the pension plan's liability, and the 
order purporting to accomplish that expansion cannot 
therefore be recognized as a QDRO under section 
1056(d)(3)(D). By holding that the Plan in this case was 
obligated to recognize the New Jersey court's order in this 
case as a QDRO, we would make pension plans vulnerable 
to the sort of abuse shown in Payne. 
 
Finally, Robichaud argues that we must give retroactive 
effect to the state court amendment of the decree because 
that decree stated that it was nunc pro tunc. Actually, the 
state judge recognized that he had power only to affect the 
legal relation between the Robichaud and the Samaroo 
estate and that the effect of the amendment on the Plan 
was a matter of federal ERISA law over which the federal 
district court had retained jurisdiction when it remanded 
the divorce case to the state courts. The state court said: 
"Of course, it will be for the federal court to decide whether 
or not there were any benefits to be left to Ms. Robichaud." 
This observation was correct; the effect of the amended 
decree on the Plan is a matter of federal law which the 
district court did not remand to the state court. See 
Samaroo, 743 F. Supp. at 317. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
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MANSMANN, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
Today the majority holds, in effect, that a state court's 
power to enter or modify a Qualified Domestic Relations 
Order ("QDRO") with respect to a participant's interest in a 
pension plan ends with the participant's death. 1 Because I 
believe that this holding will work an unwarranted 
interference with the states' ability to administer their 
domestic relations law and to effectuate equitable divisions 
of marital assets, I must respectfully dissent. 
 
Initially, I note that the majority's holding is not 
compelled by anything in the governing Act. The only 
statutory authority cited by the majority is 29 U.S.C. 
S 1056(d)(3)(D), which provides that a QDRO cannot require 
a plan to provide increased benefits. The majority approves 
the District Court's holding to the effect that"a decree 
conferring survivors' benefits on Robichaud after those 
benefits have lapsed would provide increased benefits and 
therefore cannot be a QDRO." Supra at 12. By assuming 
that the benefits were conferred after they had lapsed (i.e., 
after Mr. Samaroo's death), however, it begs the central 
question whether the state court's entry of its order nunc 
pro tunc, as of a date before Mr. Samaroo's death, is to be 
given effect.2 
 
The majority's holding also is not compelled by caselaw. 
The cases relied on by the District Court and the majority 
both involved attempts to divest and transfer benefits 
already vested in a subsequent spouse. See Hopkins v. 
AT&T Global Informations Solutions Co., 105 F.3d 153 (4th 
Cir. 1997); Ross v. Ross, 705 A.2d 784 (N.J. Super. App. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The majority expressly forecloses a post-death modification of a QDRO 
which requires "increased benefits." In addition, the Hopkins and Ross 
cases on which the majority's decision is premised foreclose any shifting 
of benefits once vested in a particular payee upon a participant's death. 
See infra 12-13. I am therefore unable to conceive of circumstances in 
which, under the majority's reasoning, a meaningful alteration of a 
QDRO could be effected post-death. 
 
2. There appears to be no dispute that if the order had actually been 
entered on its stated effective date, Ms. Robichaud would be entitled to 
the survivor's benefit she seeks. There is also no dispute that the Plan 
did not appeal the state court's decision, making itfinal. 
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Div. 1998).3 The only case cited by the parties in which 
benefits had not vested in another holds that the 
retroactive decree must be given effect. See Payne v. 
GM/UAW Pension Plan, No. 95-CV-73554-DT, 1996 WL 
943424, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7966 (E.D. Mich. May 7, 
1996). 
 
The majority characterizes the state court's retroactive 
amendment of a divorce decree in Payne as "abuse", 
apparently because the husband had refused to grant the 
requested survivor designation in negotiations while he was 
alive.4 I am not so ready to presume that a state judge, fully 
apprised of the facts, possessed of expertise in domestic 
relations matters, and sworn to uphold the law, has 
participated in or countenanced abuse. In any event, as 
discussed below, I believe that we are required to assume 
that such judicial acts are legitimate. 
 
In rejecting the contention that the state court decree 
must be given retroactive effect because it stated that it was 
nunc pro tunc, the majority explains that the effect of the 
decree on the Plan is a matter of federal law over which the 
District Court had retained jurisdiction. While I agree that 
the effect was for the District Court to determine under 
federal law, I cannot agree with the implicit premise that 
federal law permits us to disregard the decree's express 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Ross holding was premised in part on the Court's observation that 
"[n]o federal case has allowed a QDRO to be entered after a participant's 
death." 705 A.2d at 797. However, the (unpublished) Payne case was 
decided prior to Ross. 
 
4. See supra at 10-11. The majority's opinion reflects an implicit 
assumption that domestic relations orders merely reflect what the 
parties have agreed to. Cf. supra at 9-10 (stating that Mr. Samaroo -- 
rather than the state court -- could have entered a QDRO while he lived, 
and that his estate -- rather than the state court-- designated Ms. 
Robichaud as surviving spouse after his death). While it may often work 
that way in practice, I know of no rule that precludes a state court from 
ordering relief that one party has refused to accede to in negotiations. 
On the contrary, although courts in New Jersey will enforce consensual 
agreements for equitable distribution "if found to be fair and just", they 
nevertheless retain "the utmost leeway and flexibility in determining 
what is just and equitable in making allocations of marital assets". Smith 
v. Smith, 72 N.J. 350, 359-60, 371 A.2d 1 (1977). 
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retroactivity provision. On the contrary, federal law 
mandates that we give effect to the decree in accordance 
with its terms. 
 
In my view the question before us -- whether to 
effectuate the state court's nunc pro tunc order -- is 
conclusively answered in the affirmative by the Full Faith 
and Credit Act, which provides that the judicial proceedings 
of a state court "shall have the same full faith and credit in 
every court within the United States . . . as they have by 
law or usage in the courts of such State . . . ." 28 U.S.C. 
S 1738. We have observed that this section"directs all 
courts to treat a state court judgment with the same 
respect that it would receive in the courts of the rendering 
state", and that we may not "employ [our] own rules . . . in 
determining the effect of state judgments, but must accept 
the rules chosen by the State from which the judgment is 
taken". In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank 
Products Liability Litigation, 134 F.3d 133, 141-42 (3d Cir. 
1998) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 
U.S. 367, 373 (1996) (brackets and ellipsis in original; 
internal quotation marks and citation omitted). These 
principles apply in determining the effect of a state decree 
in a federal action. See American Sur. Co. v. Baldwin , 287 
U.S. 156, 166 (1932) ("The full faith and credit clause, 
together with the legislation pursuant thereto, applies to 
judicial proceedings of a state court drawn into question in 
an independent proceeding in the federal courts."); Grimes 
v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1562 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (holding that Full Faith and Credit Act bars 
relitigation of issues decided by a state court even as 
applied to claims over which the state court lacked 
jurisdiction) (citing Marrese v. American Academy of 
Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380-81 (1985). 
 
Because the courts of New Jersey would respect a nunc 
pro tunc provision in a final judgment, we are required to 
respect it as well. See, e.g., Fulton v. Fulton, 204 N.J. 
Super. 544, 549, 499 A.2d 542, 545 (Chanc. Div. 1985) 
(holding that nunc pro tunc entry of divorce decree would 
determine surviving spouse status for purpose of intestate 
distribution); Olen v. Olen, 124 N.J. Super. 373, 307 A.2d 
121 (App. Div. 1973) (remanding for amendment of divorce 
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judgment, nunc pro tunc as of original judgment before 
wife's death).5 
 
Although I believe the full faith and credit analysis is 
dispositive, giving effect to the state court's decree also 
furthers the policy interests at stake. There is good reason 
to allow state courts some leeway in entering or modifying 
domestic relations orders even after a participant's death, 
or retirement, or other status-altering event. The state 
courts are charged with administering the important, and 
often complex and volatile, area of domestic relations law.6 
The evident purpose of the ERISA's recognition of QDROs is 
to avoid undue interference with state courts' fulfillment of 
that charge.7 Imposing a cut-off date by which a state 
court's orders must be in prescribed form -- a cut-off that 
does not appear anywhere in the text of ERISA -- would 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Cf. Ross, 705 A.2d at 797 (reasoning that due to ERISA preemption, 
"New Jersey's concepts of equity cannot be applied and a QDRO cannot 
be entered after the fact"). 
 
6. See, e.g. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) ("The 
whole subject of domestic relations of husband and wife . . . belongs to 
the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.") 
(quoting 
In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-594 (1890)); Brandon v. Travelers Insur. 
Co., 18 F.3d 1321, 1326 (5th Cir. 1994) (observing in ERISA preemption 
analysis that "[f]ederal respect for state domestic relations law has a 
long 
and venerable history" and that "[w]hen courts face a potential conflict 
between state domestic relations law and federal law, the strong 
presumption is that state law should be given precedence" because "[t]he 
law of family relations has been a sacrosanct enclave"). Cf. American 
Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 122 (2nd Cir. 1979) 
(referring to the "fundamental principle of statutory interpretation 
(whereby) courts have presumed that the basic police powers of the 
States, particularly the regulation of domestic relations, are not 
superseded by federal legislation unless that was the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress"). 
 
7. As the District Court acknowledged, "Congress' concern that the 
combination of ERISA preemption and the provisions of REA would lead 
to unnecessary federal involvement in state domestic relations laws 
prompted the statutory exemption of [QDROs] from ERISA preemption. 
Samaroo, 743 F. Supp. 309, 315 (D.N.J. 1990) (citing 29 U.S.C. 
S 1144(b)(7)). 
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unnecessarily impede those courts' efforts to provide for a 
just disposition of marital assets.8 
 
There appears to be no strong countervailing policy 
reason to warrant such interference in this case. I agree 
that it is important not to upset the actuarial basis of 
pension plans, but it is hard to believe that the single 
survivor benefit at issue here is material to the actuarial 
soundness of a plan with 87,500 participants. Moreover, 
the Plan does not allege that it reduced funding levels or 
otherwise changed its position in reliance on a belief that it 
would not have to pay a surviving spouse benefit with 
respect to Mr. Samaroo. 
 
Finally, I cannot agree with the majority's contention that 
designation of Ms. Robichaud as surviving spouse after Mr. 
Samaroo died without remarrying would allow him to "have 
his cake and eat it, too"9 because Mr. Samaroo retained the 
right to confer surviving spouse status on a new wife so 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Thus, for example, the court in Ross lamented that the "unfortunate 
result" of its holding (disallowing correction of a QDRO where benefits 
had vested in a subsequent spouse) was that "equity will not prevail." 
705 A.2d at 797. 
 
Post-death (or post-retirement) entry or modification of a decree may 
reasonably occur in a variety of circumstances, including, e.g., clerical 
error, appeals, and delays attendant on the formulation of an 
appropriate order. This is an example of the former: Mr. Samaroo's 
attorney, who drafted the domestic relations order, testified that, 
although they did not specifically discuss survivorship benefits, Mr. 
Samaroo indicated his intent that Ms. Robichaud receive half interest in 
"everything he had or was entitled to" and that it was only due to the 
attorney's unfamiliarity with ERISA that the survivor designation was 
erroneously omitted. See Joint Appendix at 553-54. Counsel also 
testified that he had no doubt that Mr. Samaroo would have wanted Ms. 
Robichaud to receive survivorship benefits, see Joint Appendix at 555, 
and confirmed in a submission to the state court that "the intent of [Mr. 
Samaroo] at that time was to give this 50 per cent [survivorship] right to 
his then wife unconditionally and without any contingencies thereto." 
Joint Appendix at 583. Even if the evidence regarding the scrivener's 
error is inconclusive, the state court's acceptance of the attorney's word 
should not be disregarded by a federal court bound to give the state 
court's determination full faith and credit. 
 
9. Maj. Op. at 10. 
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long as no QDRO designated his former wife as surviving 
spouse. If the state court's nunc pro tunc order is credited, 
after its effective date Mr. Samaroo retained the right to 
accord a new wife surviving spouse status only to the 
extent of the 50% interest not already granted to Ms. 
Robichaud.10 Thus, Mr. Samaroo would not have been 
allowed to have his cake and eat it, too; instead, the law 
allows the state court to divide the cake equitably and 
mandates that ERISA plans give effect to that division. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the decision of 
the District Court and remand with instructions to accord 
full faith and credit to the state court's retroactive QDRO. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The majority cites 29 U.S.D.C S 1056(d)(3)(F) for the proposition that 
"if QDRO designates former spouse as participant's surviving spouse, 
current spouse shall not be treated as spouse for purposes of plan". Id. 
I do not read the statute to provide such an all-or-nothing choice. Under 
the statute, a former spouse shall be treated as a surviving spouse, and 
a subsequent spouse shall not be so treated, only"[t]o the extent 
provided" in a QDRO. 29 U.S.C. S 1056(d)(3)(F). Here, the "extent 
provided" is 50%. The REA expressly recognizes the right to make such 
partial designations. See 29 U.S.C. S 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I) (defining QDRO 
as 
order which, inter alia, recognizes or assigns right to receive "all or a 
portion" of benefits under a plan). A natural reading would call for 
treating Ms. Robichaud as surviving spouse to the extent of 50% of the 
applicable benefit, and treating a new wife (if any) as spouse only to the 
extent of the remaining 50%. 
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